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1 Introduction.
It has over the last years become increasingly clear that the tendency to use the NNP or GDP
as an indicator of the welfare of society and basis for policy decisions can have deploring
consequences. Many factors essential to human welfare and life are ignored; perhaps one of
the gravest examples of this is pollution. In this paper we will try to describe and assess one
of the traditions developed in order to get a measure of welfare taking into account some of
the factors not included in NNP and the system of national accounts, SNA.
Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) (NT) presented their "Measure of Economic Welfare" , MEW.
This measure uses SNA consumption as a starting point to find a more correct measure of
consumption or welfare. They intended to study the development of welfare over time, and
specifically the correlation between the development of MEW and NNP. Later several other
proposals in the same tradition have been put forward, e.g. Daly and Cobb (1990) (DC)
suggested the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, ISEW. Among the other attempts
to measure welfare, the Net National Welfare Committee of Japan (1973) suggested Net
National Welfare, and Zolotas (1981) suggested Economic Aspects of Welfare.
The measures in this tradition have some special characteristics. They do to some extent
reclassify posts in the SNA and make some imputations to get a more correct measure of
consumption than SNA consumption. One example of this is that consumer durables are
treated as capital, and services from this stock are imputed and considered as consumption.
Factors included in SNA consumption that does not affect welfare directly are subtracted.
NT labeled these "instrumental expenses" , and argued that they should be treated like
input in production. By adding and subtracting imputed values for other factors that affect
welfare, e.g. the value of leisure, household work and disamenities of urbanization a measure
reflecting welfare is obtained.
Instrumental expenditures are expenditures that do not yield utility directly, but are "re-
grettably necessary" inputs in other activities that yield utility. In NT's own words: "Even if
the "regrettable" outlays are rational responses to unfavourable shifts in the environment of
economic activity, we believe that a welfare measure, perhaps unlike a production measure,
should record such an environmental change."
DC use the related concept "defensive expenditures" defined as expenditures necessary as
a defense against the unwanted side effects of other kinds of production processes, and not a
defense against normal baseline environmental conditions. NT's instrumental expenditures
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are not confined to the effects of other production, but include all activities that does not
directly yield utility.
The line between final and instrumental outlays is hard to draw, and one difficulty
with this kind of adjustment is the interpretation of all or most expenditures as regrettably
necessary to live or lead a good life. Becker (1976) pointed out that the household can be seen
"as a small factory", and Sen (1985) distinguished between commodities and functionings.
Both these points of view indicate that all expenses can be considered instrumental. How
directly an expenditure enters a utility function is not observable and hence not a good
basis for an accounting procedure.
The concept of defensive expenditures proposed by DC is more operational, since we
may observe what enters the production process. They do not, however, specify how directly
these side effects must follow from production. Are crime rates a result of alienation due
to organization of production? And why should we subtract only expenditure to defense
against side effects of production, and not other side effects?
The proposed adjustments was introduced without any explicit model-based analysis.
Our intention is to use a more formal and analytical approach than has been usual. This
is done in order to clarify the discussion and to highlight some of the implicit assumptions
made. We will use the terms defensive and instrumental expenditures interchangeably.
Both NT and DC made a correction for the "disamenities of urbanization". While these
are not considered defensive expenditures, the boundary between the two types of corrections
is unclear, and hence we will discuss these adjustments too. There are other adjustments
made in these measures, e.g. for durable consumer goods, advertising or environment and
natural resources, but these are not discussed in any detail here. When attempting to
measure the welfare of a nation or society, one must assume a standard of evaluation - a
social welfare function. With this assumption, marginal changes in welfare will in general be
a weighted sum of the individual welfare changes in monetary units, see e.g. Dréze and Stern
(1987). The present analysis will, for sake of argument, adopt the standard assumption that
all weights should be chosen equal to unity. This assumption is essential to the claim that
NNP has a welfare interpretation. We do not, however, make any claim that this assumption
is reasonable.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we consider defensive expenditures.
Should expenditures that do not directly enter the utility function be excluded from a
welfare measure? In section 3 we consider the disamenities of urbanization. We argue that
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the adjustment proposed by DC (section 3.1) is incomplete and only takes into account
the negative externalities of urban life. We also present a migration model to analyse the
adjustments made by NT (section 3.3 and 3.4). We argue that this adjustment is correct at
the margin. On the other hand, there may be serious problems of doublecounting. Section
4 is an overview of the different corrections made within this tradition. Finally, section 5
concludes the discussion.
2 Production of defensive goods and services.
In their MEW, NT subtract public expenditures for national defense, and these and several
other subtractions are considered defensive expenditures. By using a simple model with
production of services that are public and intended to rectify consequences of production,
we will discuss how these should be treated in an attempt to measure welfare or "true"
consumption. The important aspect of this model is that the defensive expenditures affect
utility only indirectly, and that the actual utility-yielding good is a non-market good; it
may be externalities or a public good as in this model.
The discussion is intended as an illustration of a whole class of adjustments, where there
are expenditures to reduce disutility-yielding factors, e.g. costs to clean up pollution or
health costs to reduce the effect on pollution on health.
2.1 A presentation of the model.
Let us start with a simple model where the utility or welfare of individuals, U, depends
on the level of consumption, C, and the level of some service, S, in the society. This
service may be clean air from the environment, or national security. In the following, we
will use "security" and "services" interchangeably. The amount of security enjoyed depends
on the amount of defensive expenditures D used as inputs in the production of security,
e.g. expenditures to the police and the judicial system, but it also depends upon some
parameter O. This parameter can be external, like international political events affecting
national security, or internal, like increased pollution that affect environmental services.
Utility is then U = u(C , S) where u is increasing in both consumption and security. Net
national product, Y, can be used for consumption, C, or as input, D, in the production of
security. The model is static since there exists no saving or borrowing opportunities. In
this model, we will for simplicity assume that Y is exogenously determined, either by the
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inherent dynamics in the economic system or by policy makers. We use C as the numeraire
good.
The level of services supplied is determined by the production function S = f(D,O)
where hp is strictly positive, but decreasing, and where O is an exogenous variable. 0
may reflect dependence on developments that are exogenous in our model like the level of
urbanization or specialization of production.
Changes in utility can be written
(1) dU = dC + u 8fDdD u 3fed0,
using Cas numeraire (Tic = 1). Maximizing the utility of the representative consumer gives
the first-order-condition u s
 if]) = 1. Inserted in (1) this gives
(2) dU = dC dD usfo dO = dY u 3 fec10.
Alternatively the welfare changes can be written
(3 )
	
dU dC uscIS dY — dD usdS
This shows that there are two ways to report the welfare changes, either (2) or (3).
Assuming that the value of exogenous changes in services is known, it is sufficient to know
changes in income Y. Alternatively, if the shadow price on the service, u, , is known, the
welfare changes will be completely determined by the changes in consumption and the
changes in services supplied. In cases where (3) is most appropriate, we would have to
exclude defensive expenditures, but supplement the income statistics with information on
the development of the good produced by these expenditures. In other cases (2) may be
the most appropriate form. These two alternatives will serve as a basis for the following
discussion.
2.2 Possible adjustments to measure welfare:
If we are searching for a measure representing the change in total welfare, the sole subtraction
of defensive expenditures is correct only when the level of services supplied is constant. From
(3) we note that
(4) dU = dY — dD if and only if u sciS = 0
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Since there would be no need for defensive expenditures to produce S if us = 0, the only
interesting case is dS = O. Similarly, using (2) we see that
(5) dU dY if and only if u8 f9c/0 = 0
where the interesting case is MO = O. Which of these conditions is the most reasonable
would depend upon the intended use of the welfare measure. Remember that (5) is based
on the assumption that the defensive expenditures are optimally chosen.
To understand the consequences of these observations we consider some specific cases.
First, consider military spending, that are considered defensive by NT. We will have to
consider two cases, first the evaluation of welfare changes over time. In this case S could be
interpreted as national security. The exogenous factor 19 may represent international political
changes, like the breakdown of the communist regimes in eastern Europe. These changes
may be important to national security and usfed0 will hardly be negligible. In this case dY
would not account for all welfare changes,as can be seen from (5). On the other hand the
assumption that dS = 0 would be equally problematic. Thus neither would dC = dY — dD
fully account for all welfare changes. In both cases we would have to rely on supplementary
information on either u3fe d0 or u selS. The term u s is common for both cases, and hence we
ignore the problem of measuring this shadow price. If we have reliable information about dS
but not on fe d0, subtracting defensive expenditures and adding information on dS would be
the best choice, and vice versa. This implies that it is easier to measure the changes in level
of national security than to identify external changes contributing to changes in national
security. To our knowledge there is exist no such argument to support the subtraction of
military spending.
The above discussion assumes that we are comparing welfare at different points in time.
Perhaps the most important use of GDP as a welfare measure is to evaluate the consequences
of different policy proposals. While there are policy options that would be interpreted as
provocative to hostile regimes, the exogenous factors that influence national security will be
the same for most policy options. In this case a = 0, and hence dY would fully account for
the welfare changes without any subtraction for defensive expenditures. On the other hand,
unless the defensive expenditures are equal in all policy proposals, dS O. Thus GDP less
defensive expenditures would be an inappropriate welfare measure. Note, however, that NT
did not consider this use of their Measure of Economic Welfare.
These arguments also appear to provide a justification for not treating food consumption
as defensive expenditures. Consuming the same amount of food at different points in time,
or under different policy proposals, would provide the same nutrition, hence dO = O. But
even food is not solely used to meet basic needs. The access to fresh exotic fruits is now
common even to relatively poor people in Scandinavia, while some hundred years ago this
was high status, hardly available for the king. The status a black and white TV-set can
provide today is radically different from the status it provided some 25 years ago. Many
of the functionings that commodities provide are social in character and would change as
social structures are changing. For a discussion see Dittmar (1992). Thus it is not clear that
the assumption that cit9 = 0 is better founded for material consumption than for military
spending.
As pointed out above, one of the main differences between instrumental expenses in
NT and defensive expenditures in DC is that DC require the defensive expenditures to be
defenses against unwanted side effects of production. With this restriction, we would not
expect dO = 0 when considering different policy alternatives, and we cannot unambiguously
conclude that dD should be included in the welfare measure. This may be the main reason
to restrict attention to side effects of production. But even if clO 0, we have to prove that
dS = 0 to conclude that dY — dD is the best welfare measure.
While DC is not explicit on the requirement that dS = 0, they appear to recognise it.
E.g. they explicitly claim that governmental expenditures except expenditures on health
services do not contribute to welfare at all; thus dS O. They also claim that 50% of the
increase in health expenses from the 1950 level are welfare improving, implying that the
remaining 50% of the increase is just enough to offset the negative effects of pollution and
other side effects of production. In our model this would be interpreted as a claim that
u(Do + —1 dD,O0 c10) = u(D0,0o)2
where (D0 ,00) referes to the level in 1950. By the first order condition fru s = 1, we get
us f9c/61
 —VD. Their implicit claim is that the value of the side effects is minus half
the value of increased health expenditures. Inserted in (5), we get an estimate of the total
welfare effect
dU dC + —1 dD
2
which is the proposal of DC. (While these assumptions provide a justification for their
correction, their assumption has not been justified, but remains somewhat arbitrary.) Note
that these arguments at best apply to changes over time. If we are comparing policies with
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different levels of government expenditures and health expenses, it seems unreasonable to
assume that they all exactly offset the unwanted side effects of production.
To conclude this section we note that the subtraction of defensive expenditures is not
reasonable when there are no external forces, dO =O. It should also be documented that
there are no changes in the supply of security, dS = O. We have also argued that for
the purpose of evaluating different policy proposals, defensive expenditures should not be
subtracted in cases where the side effect is independent of the proposed policy.
NT's expressed intention by subtracting defensive expenditure, is to get a better measure
of what they call "economic welfare" or "true" consumption. Defining S as non-economic
and C as the real consumption, C D, would tautologically be a measure of economic
welfare. Such a proof by definition is of course not convincing, and the real argument is that
some parts of GDP is defensive rather than consumption. But, even food expenditure can
be considered as a defense against hunger, see Jaszi (1973), and thus be excluded from a
measure of economic welfare. The subtraction of defensive expenditures needs a theoretical
foundation to justify the asymmetrical treatment of D and C. One possible argument
for the asymmetry is that C enters directly in the utility function while D enters only
indirectly through S. As pointed out in the introduction this argument is inappropriate.
In Becker's (1976) model of household production, most consumption goods are treated as
input in the household production function. Similarly, Sen (1985) distinguished between
the commodities, their characteristics, and the functionings they are used to provide. In
this setup, the functionings and not the commodities are the objects of valuation. Thus
any expenditure would only indirectly enter the utility function. It may be more reasonable
to think of D as the focus of analysis. D may be military spending indirectly entering
the utility function through national security or food consumption indirectly entering the
utility through the production of a pleasure of eating or absence of hunger. C are the
remaining expenditures and is used as numeraire good. For simplicity we let C enter the
utility function directly although it can be easily checked that letting C entering the utility
function indirectly would not seriously alter our results.
3 Disamenities of urbanization.
Both NT and DC have made subtractions for the disamenities of urbanization. There is
an important connection between the estimation of these disamenities and the concepts of
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defensive or instrumental expenses. For instance DC subtract the cost of commuting, which
may be considered a defensive expenditure. Commuting to and from work is a service that is
necessary in order to get to work, and the cost of commuting changes due to external forces
like increased urbanization. I.e. the service "getting to work" is the same at all locations
and at all points in time and dS = O. Thus we should subtract the cost of commuting. If
there are systematic differences in costs of commuting between urban and rural areas, this
would change the measured welfare improvements from migration, which is the reason for
correcting for disamenities of urbanization.
When using GDP or SNA consumption as a measure of welfare, migration from rural
into urban areas will show up as an increase in welfare because of the higher income in the
cities (assuming that income is higher in urban than in rural areas). Some of this increase
may not cause an increase in welfare, but rather reflect the income differential necessary to
make the individual indifferent between living in urban and rural areas. The higher level of
income is (regrettably) necessary in order to offset the negative welfare effects from living
in urban areas. This means that GDP or SNA consumption does not necessarily represent
the welfare effects from migration correctly.
Both NT and DC assume and estimate disamenities and costs from urbanization. We
will separate the different factors and treat them separately; costs of commuting, costs of
housing and disutility from externalities.
Because of higher densities in urban areas, there will be different costs of commuting.
While not measuring time spent as a cost, there will still be expenses on petrol, car main-
tenance, fares for public transportation etc. These are considered regular consumption in
GDP, but does not yield utility directly. In the following discussion we will assume that
costs of commuting is strictly necessary to get to work and is exogenous. For simplicity
we assume that there are no costs of commuting in rural areas; alternatively there may be
differences in costs of commuting between areas.
Because of higher population densities in urban areas, land prices will be higher in urban
areas. This implies higher costs of buying and renting a house or apartment. (The costs
can be divided into a component for land and a component for buildings and structures.)
Inhabitants in urban areas experience a higher level of pollution, violence etc. that
can be expected to yield disutility. There do not exist any prices or markets where these
factors are given a money value. These externalities are exogenous to the individual, and
not subject to any optimizing behaviour.
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Throughout this discussion there has been an assumption that the welfare effects of
living in urban areas (apart from higher wages) are negative. There are clearly some positive
effects too, like more variety of available jobs and better access to public services and cultural
activities. These positive effects can be treated in our framework in the same way as the
negative ones.
3.1 The model.
The migration model presented below is designed to reflects the reasoning that seems to
be the basis for the discussions by DC and NT. It is a simple model incorporating central
economic factors behind choice of residential area and the level of wages. We have found
no similar model in the migration literature, but it may be characterized as a simple model
in the human capital tradition. For a survey of models of Urban-Rural migration, see
Bhattacharya (1993).
The representative consumer has a utility function U = u(x, d) where x is the consump-
tion vector and d is the "disamenities" or externalities which represents factors influencing
utility that is not marketed and optimized. Utility u is increasing in all elements in x, and
increasing or decreasing in d; there may be positive or negative externalities. The individual
maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint. The indirect utility function is
v(p,
 y, = max u(x, d)
px<y
where y is income.
The consequences of urbanization that DC correct for are three-fold. Prices are different,
cost of commuting is different and finally the external factor d is different. The cost of
commuting is a necessary expenditure to earn an income, hence if the cost of commuting is
r only y — r is left for consumption. Both NT and DC argue that the cost of commuting
should be subtracted from the GDP measure. The label "disamenity of urbanization" on
this subtraction is based on the view that congestion, a typically urban problem, is one of
the main causes for increased cost of commuting. Before discussing this adjustment, we
consider some of the other adjustments for urbanization.
The vector of "disamenities" d refers to many different qualities of the location, ranging
from the amount of pollution to access to cultural activities. These include both positive
and negative externalities related to urban areas. We use subscripts r and u to denote
variables referring to rural or urban areas respectively. Using the rural areas as point of
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reference, we assume that the willingness to accept d is independent of income and prices,
i.e. there exists a function 0(d) such that
v(p, y 0(4), du ) = v(p, y, dr ) for all p and y.
0(d) is the amount necessary to make an individual willing to accept the differences in
external welfare-affecting factors between urban and rural areas. Cd) is the necessary
compensation for the disamenities.
Finally, Cobb an Daly adjust the GDP measure for differences in the cost of housing. In
general we can assume that the price vector is different in urban and rural areas. Once again
using the rural values as reference point, let 0(p) denote the necessary compensation needed
for an individual to be willing to accept the price vector p; the necessary compensation for
price differences. Thus
(6) v(1),Yr «p), d) = v(Pr,Yr,
Using Roy's identity, we note that if p pr , then as a linear approximation 0(p) x • (p—pr ).
While prices may be different for many commodities, DC only consider the differences in
cost of housing, assuming that these differences are mainly representing different prices of
land. Based on a linear approximation, a rough estimate of Op) would be the area of urban
land, times the differences in average prices on urban and rural land.
To summarize this discussion, we consider the income 7 that the representative consumer
needs in an urban area to achieve the same utility as he would achieve in a rural area with
income y,. and prices pr . From (6) we conclude that to compensate for differences in land
prices, he would need y y,. «Pu) y,. xu (pu — pr ). To compensate for differences in
d, he would need 0(d). Finally, to compensate for the higher costs of commuting in urban
areas he would need an extra rv, — r,.. Adding up we get
(7) y = yr — xu(P. — pr) + 0(d) yr + p.
where p denotes the correction term and is the income difference necessary to make the
individual indifferent between the areas. The idea of adjusting GDP for disamenities of
urbanization, is to make the different income concepts comparable, by transforming urban
income yu
 into an equivalent disposable rural income "y"„ where
(8) = Yr + (Yu)= Yu P.
Thus the corrected income is the average rural income, plus the urban income in excess
of the income needed to be as well off as if living in a rural area with average income.
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This is DC's suggested corrections, and is a subtraction of costs of commuting (in urban
areas), necessary compensation for disamenities,  î/'(d),
 and necessary compensation for price
differences, (p).
3.2 Possible adjustments and their interpretations
A way to adjust GDP would be to transform all incomes into rural equivalent disposable
income. This is equivalent to subtracting the disamenities of urbanization p times the
population in urban areas. A problem with implementing this approach is that 0(d) is not
directly observable. Since there are both positive and negative aspects of urban life, the
sign of 0(d) is not obvious.
The approach followed by DC is to subtract land rent, cost of commuting and an estimate
of some of the positive parts of 0(d), (i.e. reflecting the negative aspects of urban life like
pollution, congestion etc.). This adjustment is thus urban-hostile in spirit. The positive
externalities of urban life like more variety of available jobs, easy access to cultural and
social events, and less stringent social control are completely ignored. If these positive
externalities are large, the adjustments made by DC may even be in the wrong direction.
Is it likely that the positive externalities are in order of magnitude at least similar to the
negative one that DC adjust for? The apartment prices in Manhattan are very high, even
though New York is a city with a considerable degree of violence, pollution, congestion and
social problems. Never the less people wish to live there. Some of those living there are
celebrities and movie stars, who hardly will reduce their cost of cornmuting to jobs. Perhaps
the high costs of living in urban areas may just reflect the size of these positive externalities?
In Norway, it is necessary to pay teachers, policemen and medical doctors a bonus to induce
them to work in the northern rural areas. Refugees are rebelling against being located in
rural areas. These are all observations that indicates that the positive externalities may
well outweighed the negative ones. See Berman (1982) and Sennet (1990) for a discussion
of the role of the cities and the urban influence on man, society and the arts.
Commuting is necessary for working, but so is basic nutrition and sufficient clothing to
appear in public without being ashamed. Why should cost of commuting be subtracted,
while cost of clothing are not? Why are only the difference in one component of the price
vector considered? Why are only negative externalities of urban life considered, while there
are people (like Woody Allen's characters) preferring the urban way of life and perhaps
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even willing to pay for it? While each of these adjustments can be defended, there is also a
question of the overall balance in the adjustment.
NT suggested that disamenities should estimated on basis of observed choices between
urban and rural life, through migration data. This approach will thus in principle account
for all relevant differences between urban and rural life. To analyze this approach, we have
to extend the previous model to explain migration.
3.3 A model of migration
If yt, > yr
 + p, the individual is better off in the urban area than in the rural area. Now
suppose that the value of p is different for different individuals in the population, e.g.
because some people care the most about the negative externalities while there are others
that appreciate the urban way of life. Let f(p) denote the density distribution, i.e. the
number of individuals with a < p < b is fab f(p)dp. With the wages yu and yr , the number
of individuals who want to live in the urban area is Q(y. — y r ), where
Q(yu — yr) = Yr f(x)dx
Let Pu be the number of people actually living in urban areas. Assuming that during the
next unit of time a fraction (9 of those who live in one location but would prefer to live in
the other move to their preferred location, the migration is
( 9) M = = 0 [Q(Y. — Yr) — P.]
The higher the difference between the number of people who want to live in the urban area
at a given income difference and the number of people actually living in the urban area, Pu,
the higher is migration. If M 0 all individuals i with pi > yu — yr would live in rural
areas, while all individuals where the opposite inequality applies, live in the urban areas.
The hypotetical wage difference that would induce zero migration at the current size of Pu,
should not be confused with the actual equilibrium level of wage difference, Pe
 =(y. — yr)e
that will prevail when the migration approaches zero and the urban population reaches the
equilibrium level see figure 1 belowl.
lAs the population in both areas change as a result of migration, we would expect wages to change too.
When the population of an area is reduced, the supply of labor is redced too, and we would expect wages in
this area to rise. By introducing the wage difference as a function of urban population through the demand
for labor, we find an equilibrium wage difference and urban population consistent with demand for labour
as well as individual preferences / supply of labour.
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To identify the hypotetical wage difference that induce zero migration, suppose that f
is uniform. In this case Q will be linear, Q(x) = qx qo . Now (9) can be rewritten as
(1 0)
	Yu =	 amM +
where am = (0q) -1 and
Pm = #0+ 13PPu
where 00 = —go! q and f3p = q-1 . Using a linear regression as in (10) and letting M 0, pm
can be estimated. pm is the income differential necessary to achieve zero migration at any
given level of urban population and is a function of Pi, . The difference between pm and Pe
is illustrated in figure 1.
Assume furthermore that the income of an individual in the rural areas can be written
as a linear function of some explanatory variables, i.e. yr = aX. In NT variables like
"Population over 65", and "Log of property tax per Capita" are used to explain income. If
we add the assumption that all parameters in the migration model are independent of X,
then
Y = aX amM pm Du
where Dei is an urban-dummy, with value 1 in urban areas and 0 in rural areas. Thus pm
can be estimated through a linear regression on income data.
This approach to estimating pm will not suffer from the problems pointed out with DC's
approach. The factors included in pm are all that the individuals actually migrating consider
relevant. Hence NT cannot be criticized for being biased in the set of urban externalities
they do correct for. The drawback of this method is rather the opposite. Since pm is not
selective, we do not know precisely which externalities are included.
Suppose that cost of commuting is subtracted from GDP as indicated above, and suppose
moreover that there are systematic differences in cost of commuting between urban and rural
areas. If people migrating to an urban area take this systematic difference into account,
the difference in commuting cost between urban and rural areas would be subtracted twice.
Similarly, due to differences in urban and rural life-style, there may be systematic differences
in household production in urban and rural areas. If household production is added to GDP,
there may be a similar double counting of the difference in household production. The
problem of double-counting also arises with pollution. The differences in pollution between
areas may affect the willingness to live in urban areas, and hence be included in the estimated
Pm. In this case some or all of the difference in pollution will be taken into account using this
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method (depending upon what information is available to the individuals). Subtracting for
pollution and degradation of the environment separately may then imply double-counting,
but we cannot tell from the estimated pm if, and to what extent, these factors are already
taken into account.
Our model of migration is a very simple model reflecting the economic mechanisms of
migration of income and preferences in order to highlight and describe the discussion about
whether and how to adjust NNP in order to measure welfare. As a description of the actual
processes leading to migration, we would expect this model to be a poor approximation.
Most of the U.S. migration does actually consist of migration within or between urban areas
and are not primarily urban-rural. Moreover, the motivation for migration are often of a
non-economic nature, e.g. related to life-style, a lesser degree of social control etc. Job
variability and the freedom of choice is almost certainly important as well.
3.4 Using pm to correct GDP
There are several possible ways to adjust for the fact that some or all of the wage differential
between the areas are not welfare augmenting. We will argue that none of them are entirely
convincing. For simplicity we assume that those who most prefer to live in the urban areas
are the first to move. Thus at any point in time, p for the individual that last moved, pm ,
is the highest among those who live in the urban areas,
Pm
PIL = 	 f (x)dx.
The total loss to those who live in the urban areas are now
D = 
Pm 
pf(P)c1P
The welfare changes due to migration increasing the urban population from Pu to Pu with
a corresponding increase of pm
 to/3m is
km
AD =
 J pf(p)dpps,Pm
In order to find the welfare effect from migration we should use pm , the compensation needed
for the individual in the urban area (before migration takes place) with the highest p .
One way to estimate the disamenities of urbanization is pm Pu , see figure 1. This ap-
proach is equivalent to pick among those in the urban area the individual that who least
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Figure 1: Disamenity of urbanization
appreciates living there as a representative for the entire urban population. This corre-
sponds to NT's adjustments although they use a continuous model with varying degrees of
population densities and their results are not directly comparable to our model. When pm
is kept constant, the changes in the estimated disamenities are correct.
Another possibility would be to use the equilibrium pe instead of the marginal. This
would be equivalent to using the individual with the highest disutility from living in the
urban areas among the individuals that would live in the city if the wage difference and
population are at their equilibrium values (consistent with zero migration). An approach
like this is obviously wrong, and will not be discussed further.
Figure 1 shows the inverse of the cumulative distribution function, i.e. pm as a function
of P. The equilibrium urban population is Pt! and the corresponding equilibrium income
differential is (Yu -Yr)e =-- pe . With an actual urban population of p u as shown in the figure,
the corresponding evaluation of living in the urban area for the individual that last moved
there and is the one in the urban population that least likes to live there is pm . In our
figure, the total disamenity given by the areas —D and D is clearly negative, i.e. the total
welfare effects of living in the urban area is positive. The estimated disamenities using p,,P„
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suggests that the estimated welfare effects are negative. This is equivalent to using prices as
weights on different commodities and ignoring consumer surplus. When there is migration
and urban population increases to A the correction should now be pmfit, and not The
reason for this is easily seen from the figure. The marginal urban individual at population
pi, has a higher disamenity than the marginal individual at population Pu , but there is no
changes in the disamenity of the original urban population. The error is represented by the
area B. By using pm this higher disamenity experienced by the last ones to migrate is indeed
ignored, but this error represented by the area A is of secondary importance. Further, the
change in disamenities will be correct, and equal to AD in (11).
In this approach we have not studied the effects of the increase in density in urban
areas as a result of the migration or the effect of less congestion in the rural areas. These
will, however, show up in the higher level of pm in the next time period. But another
complication may be worth mentioning. Lewis (1954) argued that when farming is the
main occupational activity in the rural areas, income will reflect the average productivity of
labor, while it is reasonable to assume that income in the urban areas reflects the marginal
productivity of labor. There may now be a benefit from urbanization, in excess of the wage
differences. This effect may not be very big in developed countries, but may be important
in less developed countries with a large share of the labour force in the agricultural sector.
On the other hand, Harris and Todaro (1970) shows that migration to urban areas may be
consistent with urban unemployment. Migration will then have a negative external effect
on the unemployed urban population. For a discussion see Bhattacharya (1993).
Another problem is that we have not considered costs and externalities of moving in this
model. When there are costs of moving in terms of money spent on the transportation of
furniture, time spent in the process of moving and the loss of friends and social contacts
and time and effort spent on getting new ones, these will be reflected in p. Although this is
clearly a part of the increase in income that is not affecting welfare. The individuals that
lives in the urban areas are not facing these costs and thus the subtraction of these may
lead to an overestimation of the disamenities faced by the urban population.
4 The Actual Adjustments made in ISEW and MEW.
We have so far considered the theoretical foundation of subtracting defensive or instrumental
expenditures and adjusting for disamenities of urbanization. We have referred to some of
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the actual corrections made by NT and DC to illustrate several points in this discussion. In
this section we will give a brief overview of all the corrections that they made.
, 
Type MEW ISEW
Military spending I subtracted
Cost of police I subtracted
Health expences investment D*
Education expeditures investment D*
Cost of commuting I D
Environmental damages part of U subtracted
Urban housing part of U U
Other urban externalities
•
part of U subtracted
I denotes instrumental expenditures, D defensive expenditures
and U disamenities of urbanization.
D* - 1/2 of growth in expenditures are defensive
Table 1: The corrections in MEW and ISEW
In table 1 we have listed the subtractions that are suggested by NT in MEW and by
DC in ISEW and we have given their own classifications of the subtractions. In both
MEW and ISEW most of the public expenditures are subtracted because they are not
considered to yield utility directly. NT have explicitly stated that expenditures for police
services and national defence are considered instrumental while DC stated that "we have
excluded most government expenditures because they measure inputs or costs rather than
outputs or profits". None of them have attempted to value the outputs or indirect utility
resulting from these expenses. (Their approach is equivalent to assuming that dS -----  0 in
the model presented in section 2.) Public expenditures on health and education are not
included in MEW, and the private expenditures are considered investments by NT and
hence subtracted from MEW. DC consider half of the growth in expenditures (both private
and governmental) on health since 1950 as defensive. They also consider half of the growth
in expenditures for higher education since 1950 as defensive. How the subtraction of health
expenditures is consistent with the model of defensive expenditures is discussed in section
2.2. The expenditures for education are easier to consider using the model of urbanization
in section 3.1. Education is necessary in order to find work, just as commuting is, and this is
DC's reason for making this subtraction. NT have subtracted costs for commuting because
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these costs are considered instrumental, DC considered these costs as defensive. Neither
included costs of time spent commuting, partly because of lack of data. Disamenities of
urbanization are the estimated income difference between urban and rural areas consistent
with zero migration in MEW. NT used a continuous valuation of the degree of urbanization
while ours in section 3.3 is discrete. They made corrections based upon the influence of
county population, density and per cent of county population in urban areas. DC make a
subtraction intended to capture the increasing cost of land caused by urbanization. They
further subtract costs of traffic accidents and some environmental damage that can be
associated with urbanization. The imputed value of environmental damages and the costs
of traffic accidents can be seen as an attempt to estimate 0(d). These suggested adjustments
in ISEW does not correspond exactly to the model we studied in section 3.1. The main
difference is that we have transformed urban income into an equivalent rural disposable
income and hence used rural welfare as point of reference or numeraire while DC uses the
hypothetical zero-cost situation as reference point. To subtract all costs of residential land
as they have done may seem strange, but they capture all welfare effects including the
increase in welfare in rural areas when prices there are reduced, while we have chosen to
focus the welfare differences in urban and rural areas.
5 Concluding notes
In this paper we have used a formal approach in order to emphasize the method and as-
sumptions underlying the results and recommendations found in the existing literature. The
formalization itself has been a separate and important point in this paper, although it has
led up to some criticism regarding the suggested adjustments to measure welfare.
We noted that the defensive expenditures should not be subtracted if there are no ex-
ogenous changes in the supply of services provided by these expenditures. For planning
purposes this will be the case for many of those expenditures that were considered instru-
mental by NT, but it may not be true in comparison over time as was NT's intention.
Defensive expenditures as defined in DC are explicitly assumed to be related to production,
and thus there may be external changes even in a planning context. Still the alternative
assumption that the supply of services is constant, is in many cases no more attractive. We
argued that the real issue is in what form supplementary information is best provided. If
external changes are easier to report than changes in services, then defensive expenditures
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should not be subtracted, and vice versa. In section 3 we provided a model of disamenities
of urbanization. While differences in rental cost of housing and cost of commuting may be
part of this disamenity, the total difference is complex and involves also positive elements.
We argued that the proposal of DC is selective with a urban-hostile bias. This bias is to
some extent overcome with the migration model and NT's approach. We demonstrated
however, that their estimate will tend to overestimate both level and marginal changes in
the disamenities of urbanization. There may also be serious problems of double counting.
In describing some of the adjustments to GDP used by NT and DC among others, we
have used some smaller models to study specific approaches. In order to arrive at con-
clusions and recommendations regarding all adjustments necessary to measure welfare or
changes in welfare, a whole set of concepts and a bigger model is necessary. In particular
there are many aspects of the concept of welfare that need to be resolved.
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